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THE NINTH CIRCUIT: NO PLACE 
FOR DRUG OFFENDERS 
Bill Ong Hing* 
In two troubling cases, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that relief 
from deportation under section 212(c) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), I is unavailable to lawful permanent 
resident alien drug offenders. The effect of the rulings in Nicholas 
v. Immigration & Naturalization Service! and Rowe v. Immigra-
tion & Naturalization Services is to foreclose any relief in deporta-
tion hearings to longtime resident aliens who are convicted of 
drug-related crimes and are deportable under section 241(a)(11) 
of the Act. 4 This development places the Ninth Circuit in direct 
• Assistant Professor of Law, Golden Gate University; J.D., University of San Fran-
cisco, 1974; LL.M. (candidate) Boait Hall; Former Director, Immigration Law Unit, San 
Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation; Staff Advisory Group, Select Com-
mission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. 
1. Section 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1976), provides: 
Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who 
temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an 
order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful unrelin-
quished domicile of seven consectutive years, may be admitted 
in the discretion of the Attorney General without regard to the 
provisions of paragraphs (1) to (25), (30) and (31) of subsection 
(a) .... 
2. 590 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. Feb., 1979) (per Takasugi, D.J., sitting by designation; the 
other panel members were Hufstedler and Tang, JJ.). 
3. 597 F .2d 1158 (9th Cir. Feb., 1979) (per Choy, J.; Bright, J., sitting by designation, 
filed a separate dissenting opinion; the other panel member was Carter, J.). 
4. Section 241(a)(11) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(l1) (1976), provides: 
Any alien in the United States. . . shall. . . be deported 
who-(11) is, or hereafter at any time after entry has been, a 
narcotic drug addict, or who at any time has been convicted of 
a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, any law or regulation 
relating to the illicit possession of or traffic in narcotic drugs 
or marihuana, or who has been convic~d of a violation of, or a 
conspiracy to violate, any law or regulation governing or con-
trolling the taxing, manufacture, production, compounding, 
transportation, sale, exchange, dispensing, giving away, impor-
tation, exportation, or the possession for the purpose of the 
manufacture, production, compounding, transportation, sale, 
exchange, dispensing, giving away, importation, or exportation 
of opium, coca leaves, heroin, marihuana, any salt derivative 
or preparation of opium or coca leaves or isonipecaine or any 
addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining opiate . . 
1 
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conflict with the Second and Tenth Circuits,5 and ignores the 
·1976 decision of Matter of Silva8 in which the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals acquiesced in the Second Circuit's position and al-
lowed such relief on a nationwide basis. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Drug offenders are in extreme disfavor under the immigra-
tion laws. Section 212(a)(23) of the Act provides for the exclusion 
from admission into the United States of any alien who has been 
convicted of a narcotic drug or marijuana offense,7 while section 
241(a)(11) of the Act provides for the deportation of any alien, 
including a lawful permanent resident alien, who has been con-
victed of a narcotic drug or marijuana offense.s Congress did, 
however, explicitly provide for the discretionary waiver of the 
drug-related ground for exclusion under section 212(c) of the Act,9 
if an alien: (1) was lawfully admitted for permanent residence 
previously, (2) had temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily, 
and (3) was returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven 
consecutive years. Therefore, by its specific language, section 
212(c) appears to apply only when a resident alien attempts to 
return after a temporary absence. However, the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals has never interpreted the waiver provision so 
narrowly. In numerous cases, the Board has allowed a section 
212(c) waiver of a ground of inadmissibility nunc pro tunc in 
deportation proceedings where an alien, after conviction, de-
parted and was subjected to deportation charges after returning. to 
The reliance of both of these decisions on Arias-Uribe v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 
466 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1972), leaves open the question of whether an application for relief 
under § 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1976), filed in conjunction with an adjust-
ment of status application under § 245 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1976), is acceptable. 
In Arias-Uribe, the court pointed out in a footnote that this question was left unanswered. 
466 F.2d at 1199 n.3. Presumably, if a lawful permanent alien is deportable for a drug 
offense and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status, an application for a waiver under 
§ 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1976), is not foreclosed. See also Matter of Smith, 
11 I. & N. Dec. 325 (1965). 
5. Vissian v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 548 F.2d 325 (lOth Cir. 1977); Francis v. 
Immigration & Nat. Serv., 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976). Since the Immigration & Naturali-
zation Service did not contest the availability of relief to an alien narcotics offender in 
Byus-Narvaez v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 601 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1979), such relief 
remains available in the Fifth Circuit as well. 
6. Interim Decision 2532 (B.I.A. Sept. 10, 1976). 
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(23) (1976). 
8. For the relevant statutory language of section 241(a)(11) of the Act, see note 4 
supra. 
9. For the relevant statutory language of section 212(c) of the Act, see note 1 supra. 
10. See, e.g., Matter of Tanori, Interim Decision 2467 (B.I.A. Feb. 4, 1976) (deporta-
2
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Under the waiver provision, the requirement that an alien 
must have "temporarily proceeded abroad" created a curious sit-
. uation. A seven-year lawful permanent resident alien convicted 
of possession of marijuana could obtain relief if s/he happened to 
take a vacation abroad after the conviction, while a similar alien 
who had not left the country would not be eligible to apply.1I As 
incongruous as this result might appear, the "temporarily pro-
ceeded abroad" requirement had been traditionally upheld. 12 
In Francis v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,13 the 
Second Circuit recognized the unfairness of such a result and 
struck down the departure requirement as violative of equal pro-
tection. 14 In Matter of Silva, 15 the Board of Immigration Appeals 
adopted Francis on a nationwide basis and stated: 
We conclude that, under the provisions of section 
212(c) of the Act, a waiver of the ground of inad-
missibility may be granted to a permanent resi-
dent alien in a deportation proceeding regardless 
of whether he departs the United States following 
the act or acts which render him deportable. In 
light of the constitutional requirements of due 
process and equal protection of the law, it is our 
position that no distinction shall be made be-
tween permanent resident aliens who temporarily 
proceed abroad and non-departing permanent res-
ident aliens. IS 
In Francis, the alien had been convicted of possession of 
tion charges based on conviction of possession of marijuana for sale); Matter of G-A-, 
7 I. & N. Dec. 274 (1956) (deportation charges based on conviction of importation of 
marijuana); Matter of S-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 392 (1954) (deportation charges based on four 
petty theft convictions). 
11. The situation is best illustrated in Matter of Tanori, Interim Decision 2467 
(B.I.A. Feb. 4, 1976), where the alien had been convicted of possession of marijuana for 
sale just over seven years from the date of his original entry. On the day of his conviction, 
he went to visit a relative in Mexico and returned about 24 hours later. The Board of 
Immigration Appeals held that the alien was eligible to apply for section 212(c) waiver 
relief because he had met the "temporarily proceeded abroad" requirement. [d. at 2-3. 
12. See, e.g., Matter of Arias-Uribe, 13 I. & N. Dec. 696 (1971), where the Board of 
Immigration Appeals held that the "requirement that an alien must have 'temporarily 
proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation' makes it clear that 
. . . we have no basis for avoiding the statutory requirement. . .. " [d. at 700. 
13. 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976). 
14. [d. at 273. Accord, Vissian v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 548 F.2d 325 (lOth Cir. 
1977). 
15. Interim Decision 2532 (B.I.A. Sept. 10, 1976). 
16. [d. at 7. 
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marijuana. Similarly, the responden,t in Silva was found guilty of 
possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute. Both aliens 
were therefore drug offenders and deportable under section 
241(a)(11) of the Act. However, in determining whether waiver 
relief under section 212(c) of the Act was available, neither the 
Second Circuit nor the Board of Immigration Appeals was trou-
bled with the fact that the alien had been convicted of an offense 
involving marijuana. IT The plain statutory language left no ques-
tion that narcotics offenders were eligible for relief under the 
waiver provision. ls Rather, the concern was with the "temporarily 
proceeded abroad" requirement, which has nothing to do with the 
offense involved and which was eventually resolved in the aliens' 
favor in both cases. I. But for these decisions, even long-time per-
manent residents of the United States convicted of the most 
minor drug offense would have no relief from deportation avail-
able to them if they had made no departure subsequent to convic-
tion.20 
17. 532 F.2d at 270-72; Interim Decision 2532 at 3. 
18. For the relevant statutory language of section 212(c) of the Act, see note 1 supra. 
Since the language explicitly extends the waiver possibility to aliens excludable under 
section 212(a) (23) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(23) (1976) (narcotics offenders), it is clear 
that Congress intended to make this relief available to narcotics offende~s. 
19. 532 F.2d at 272-73; Interim Decision 2532 at 7. 
20. The Francis and Silua decisions were a result of a direct recognition of the plight 
faced by longtime lawful permanent resident aliens who were, years after initially immi-
grating, convicted of a narcotics or marijuana offense. Prior to those decisions, it was 
understood that no § 212(c) relief was available to such aliens unless the "temporarily 
proceeded abroad" requirement had been met. There were innumberable sympathetic 
examples of the hardships that resulted. Most often the cases involved resident aliens who 
had entered as juveniles and who, fifteen or twenty years later, were convicted of simple 
possession of marijuana. Generally, there was simply no relief from deportation available 
to such individuals. Most had not met the "temporarily proceeded abroad" requirement 
of § 212(c) of the Act. Also, suspension of deportation under § 244(a)(2) of the Act, 8 
U .S.C. § 1254 (a)(2) (1976), is, for aU practical purposes, not available. This is because 
§ 244(a)(2) requires a showing of good moral character for ten years subsequent to the 
crime, but deportation authorities are not likely to wait ten years before instituting pro-
ceedings. AdditionaUy, aU arguments that deportation of aliens for simple possession of 
marijuana constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment have failed. See, e.g., Lieggi v. 
Immigration & Nat. Serv., 389 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1975), reu'd without published 
opinion, 529 F.2d 530 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 939 (1976). 
Thus, the Board of Immigration Appeal's adoption of Francis. in the Silua decision 
was a large step in aUeviating the harsh result of deportation in sympathetic cases. See 
also Matter of Marin, Interim Decision 2666 (B.I.A. Aug. 4, 1976). 
The Immigration and Naturalization Service itself took administrative steps to aUe-
viate such harsh results in some cases. On April 21, 1977, it adopted § 241.1(a)(28) into 
the Operating Instructions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service which provides: 
Unless prior approval has been received from the regional com-
missioner, no order to show cause shall be issued in the case of 
an alien who is a lawful permanent resident of the United 
4
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II. THE Nicholas AND Bowe OPINIONS: FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
In Nicholas v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,21 the 
alien, who had last entered the United States in 1967,22 was found 
deportable on two grounds. Because of a 1975 conviction for con-
spiracy to possess a controlled substance with the intent to dis-
tribute, he was deportable under section 241(a)(11) of the Act as 
a narcotics offender. He was also deportable under section 
241(a)(1) of the Act as an alien who was excludable at the time 
of entry. Apparently he had been previously deported and had not 
been granted consent to apply for readmission in 1967 as required 
by section 212(a)(17) of the Act. 23 
On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, Nicholas 
raised several points which do not appear to have been raised at 
the deportation hearing.24 He sought a discretionary waiver of 
States and whose deportability is based on section 241(a)(11) 
as one having been convicted of possession, importation or dis-
tribution of marijuana for no renumeration: Provided the 
amount of marijuana involved does not exceed 100 grams: Pro-
vided further, that in the case of a conviction for distribution 
without renumeration, the alien has been convicted of only one 
such offense. 
5 IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, OPERATIONS, INSTRUCTIONS, REGULATIONS AND 
INTERPRETATION 2852.5 (rev. ed. 1952) partially codified as 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(a)(1979). 
21. 590 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1979). Most of the Nicholas opinion dealt with the stan-
dards for review of a decision of the district director (the chief administrator of the local 
immigration office) denying the alien's application for nonpriority (deferred) status. 
Under such a status, the alien's deportation would be deferred indefinitely. This portion 
of the court's opinion is significant in that it is the First Circuit court decision which 
discusses the standards for reviewing district director decisions on non priority status 
applications.ld. at 805-08. See also Lennon v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 527 F.2d 187 
(2d Cir. 1975). 
22. The facts, as set forth in the opinion, do not state the precise status upon which 
Nicholas entered the United States in 1967. But because he had never been "lawfully 
admitted for permanent resident status," it can be inferred that he either entered illegally 
or as a nonimmigrant. 
23. Section 212(a)(17) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(17) (1976), provides: 
Except as otherwise provided . . . the following classes of al-
iens shaH be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded 
from admission . . . (17) Aliens who have been arrested and 
deported ... unless prior to their embarcation or reembarca-
tion at a place outside the United States or their attempt to be 
admitted ... the Attorney General has consented to their 
applying or reapplying for admission . . . . 
24. The opinion indicates that the only relief sought by Nicholas at his deportation 
hearing was nunc pr{J tunc permission to reapply for admission after deportation. The 
immigration judge denied the requested reapplication. 590 F.2d at 804. 
5
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deportability under section 212(c) of the Act and a remand to 
show eligibility for non-priority status and to apply for political 
asylum. The Board dismissed the appeal and Nicholas petitioned 
for review in the Ninth Circuit. However, the Ninth Circuit de-
nied his claim to non priority status25 and held that relief under 
section 212(c) of the Act was unavailable. 
In support of his request for relief under section 212(c) of the 
Act, Nicholas contended that even though he had not been 
"lawfully admitted for permanent resident status," as required 
by the statute,28 to deny him such relief would constitute a denial 
of equal protection. However, the court felt that it did not have 
to reach the equal protection argument, and shocked observers by 
stating that "[r]elief under section 212(c) has been held in this 
circuit to be unavailable to an alien facing deportation for convic-
tion of a drug-related crime, pursuant to [section 214(a)(11) of 
the Act]. "27 The court reasoned that since this was one ofthe two 
grounds of deportability, Nicholas would be ineligible for relief 
under section 212(c) of the Act "even in the event he was granted 
permanent resident status."28 The court cited two cases to sup-
port the proposition that the waiver relief of section 212(c) was 
unavailable to narcotics offenders: Arias-Uribe v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Service, 28 and Dunn v. Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Service. 30 
In Bowe v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,31 section 
241(a)(11) of the Act was the sole ground for deportation. Bowe 
had entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident at 
the age of sixteen in 1966, but in 1976 he was convicted of smug-
gling cocaine. At his deportation hearing, Bowe admitted deport-
ability but applied for discretionary waiver relief under section 
212(c) of the Act. The immigration judge denied the waiver and 
Bowe appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. He con-
tended that the immigration judge had failed to afford him a full 
and fair hearing on the application for section 212(c) waiver by 
not allowing him to present certain evidence. However, the Board 
25. See note 20 supra and accompanying text. 
26. For the relevant statutory language of § 212(c) of the Act, see note 1 supra. 
27. 590 F.2d at 808. 
28.Id. 
29. 466 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1972). 
30. 499 F.2d 856 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1106 (1974). 
31. 597 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1979). 
6
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affirmed the decision of the immigration judge and Bowe sought 
review in the Ninth Circuit.32 
In its original decision issued on February 7, 1979, a unani-
mous Ninth Circuit panel remanded the matter, agreeing that 
Bowe had been denied a fair hearing. But the court, thereafter, 
recalled its mandate and issued the revised opinion on April 23, 
1979. In a two-to-one decision, the majority relied on the Nicholas 
opinion which had been issued on February 2, 1979, for the propo-
sition that relief under section 212(c) of the Act was unavailable 
to narcotics offenders.33 In addition to Nicholas, the Bowe major-
ity cited only Dunn and Arias-Uribe. 34 
m. ANALYSIS 
The Nicholas decision relied on merely two cases for the 
premise that waiver relief under section 212(c) of the Act is una-
vailable to narcotics offenders deportable under section 
241(a)(11) of the Act. The Bowe case in turn relied on Nicholas. 35 
Thus if the reasoning in Nicholas fails, so must that in Bowe. An 
examination of Arias-Uribe v. Immigration & Naturalization 
Service38 and Dunn v. Immigration & Naturalization Service37 
reveals that those cases do not stand for the principle which the 
panel in Nicholas (and thus the panel in Bowe) ascribes to them. 
Arias-Uribe involved a lawful permanent resident alien who 
had been convicted of possession of heroin. Deportability was 
charged under section 241(a)(11) of the Act, and waiver relief 
under section 212(c) was sought at the deportation hearing. 3s The 
deportation proceedings and subsequent review by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals took place prior to the Second Circuit deci-
sion in Francis v. Immigration & Naturalization Service39 and the 
Board's new policy opinion in Matter of Silva. 40 Arias-Uribe 
therefore faced a strict reading of section 212(c)-especially the 
requirement that he must have "temporarily proceeded abroad" 
32. [d. at 1159-60. 
33. [d. at 1158. 
34. [d. 
35. [d. 
36. 466 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1972). 
37. 499 F.2d 856 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1106 (1974). 
38. 466 F.2d at 1199. 
39. 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976). 
40. Interim Decision 2532 (B.I.A. Sept. 10, 1976). 
7
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subsequent to his conviction}! Since Arias-Uribe had never done 
so, the Board of Immigration Appeals found that section 212(c) 
relief was unavailable, affirmed the order of deportation and dis-
missed the appeal}2 
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court affirmed the deci-
sion of the Board of Immigration Appeals. 43 In so doing, the court 
in Arias-Uribe did not purport to deviate from the Board's reason-
ing. Thus the Ninth Circuit held relief under section 212(c) of the 
Act unavailable not because Arias-Uribe had been convicted of 
possession of heroin, but because he had not "temporarily pro-
ceeded abroad" as required by the language of the waiver provi-
sion. 44 In discussing cases relied upon by Arias-Uribe's counsel, 
the court did not distinguish cases involving narcotics convictions 
from cases involving non-narcotics convictions}5 Instead, the 
court was most concerned with the point that "[e]ach of them 
involved an alien who was excludable at the time he last entered 
the United States."48 Thus, what was significant to the court was 
that Arias-Uribe had not departed and reentered subsequent to 
conviction. The court spoke of the disfavor in which the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act holds narcotics offenders; however, at 
no point did the court attempt to go beyond the provisions of the 
Act to develop additional sanctions against narcotics offenders.47 
The language of section 212(c) of the Act explicitly covers narcot-
ics offenders.48 The court did not overturn an administrative deci-
sion cited by the appellant in which such waiver relief had been 
granted to a narcotics offender.4u Thus Arias-Uribe cannot be 
41. For the relevant statutory language of § 212(c) of the Act, see note 1 supra. 
42. Matter of Arias-Uribe, 13 I. & N. Dec. 696 (1971). 
43. 466 F.2d at 1200. 
44. [d. 
45. [d. at 1199, citinp Matter of Eng. 121. & N. Dec. 855 (1968) (possession of heroin); 
Matter of Smith, 111. & N. Dec. 325 (1965) (disorderly conduct); Matter of G-A-, 71. 
& N. Dec. 274 (1956) (importation of marijuana); Matter of S-, 61. & N. Dec. 393 (1954) 
(petty larceny). 
46. 466 F.2d at 1199. 
47. [d. 
48. See note 18 supra. 
49. 466 F.2d at 1199. Matter of G-A-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 274 (1956) (convicted of 
importation of marijuana). 
The Arias-Uribe decision could be read for the proposition that the only time a drug 
offender is eligible for relief under § 212(c) of the Act is when the grounds for exclusion 
under 212(a) (23) of the Act are being charged by the government. This would require that 
the person be the subject of an exclusion proceeding or of a deportation proceeding under 
§ 241 (a)(1) of the Act, where the alien was excludable at the time of entry before the relief 
of § 212(c) would be available. Under such an interpretation, the immigration authorities 
8
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cited for the proposition that the Nicholas and Bowe panels as-
cribe to it, that is, that narcotics offenders are per se ineligible 
for relief under section 212(c) of the Act. Rather, it is merely 
another pre-Francis and Silva decision which mandated strict 
adherence to the "temporarily proceeded abroad" requirement. 
Dunn v. Immigration & Naturalization Service50 adds noth-
ing to the court's reasoning in Nicholas and Bowe. Ten years after 
his admission as a permanent resident, Dunn was cOIivicted of 
possession of marijuana. Deportation proceedings were instituted 
against him under section 241(a)(11) of the Act and he sought 
waiver relief under section 212(c) even though he had never left 
the United States since his original entry. 51 The controlling issue 
for the court in Dunn was again the fact that the "temporarily 
proceeded abroad" requirement of section 212(c) had not been 
met. 
Petitioner urges that he should be eligible for dis-
cretionary relief from deportation under 
§ 212(c) of the Act ... even though he is not 
technically "returning to the United States after 
a voluntary departure." In effect Petitioner is re-
questing advance permission to return to an unre-
linquished domicile, despite the fact that other-
wise he would be ineligible for admittance under 
section 212(a)(23) ... as an "alien who has been 
convicted of a violation of. . . any law or regula-
tion relating to the illicit possession of or traffic in 
narcotic drugs or marihuana." 
As petitioner recognizes in his brief, this pre-
cise contention was rejected by this court in Arias-
Uribe v. INS . ... 52 
The court in Dunn did not hold that narcotics offenders are 
per se ineligible for relief under section 212(c) of the Act; rather, 
it was concerned that Dunn was not returning after a voluntary 
could thwart § 212(c) relief to such an alien by charging deportability under § 241 (a)(11) 
of the Act instead. This interpretation of the law was expressly rejected in Matter of 
G-A-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 274 (1956). It is clear that such a result would render § 212(c) of 
the Act totally meaningless whenever a corresponding ground for deportation (§ 241(a)(I)) 
existed for a ground of exclusion (§ 241(a)(11)). 
50. 499 F.2d 856 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 419 U.S. 1106 (1974). 
51. [d. at 857. 
52. [d. (footnote omitted). 
9
Hing: No Place For Drug Offenders
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980
10 . GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1 
departure.53 The court's reliance on Arias-Uribe was only for that 
limited principle as well, and the case was not cited for the un-
supported notion that section 212(c) relief is not available to any 
narcotics offenders. 
The Ninth Circuit decisions in Arias-Uribe and Dunn do not, 
therefore, support the conclusions which the panels in Nicholas 
and Bowe appear to have reached, namely that all narcotics of-
fenders are ineligible for relief under section 212(c) of the Act. 
The key point in Arias-Uribe and Dunn was that the alien had 
made no departure subsequent to conviction and therefore did 
not meet the "temporarily proceeded abroad" requirement. The 
fact that both cases involved narcotics offenders is coincidental. 
A long-time permanent resident alien deportable for another 
criminal offense prior to Silva54 would have also been denied sec-
tion 212(c) waiver relief if the "temporarily proceeded abroad" 
requirement subsequent to conviction had not been met.55 
The decisions in Nicholas and Bowe are troubling in other 
respects. Neither panel dealt with Silva58 which was decided sub-
sequent to Arias-Uribe and Dunn, in which the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals acquiesced in the Second Circuit's opinion of 
Francis v. Immigration & Naturalization Service57 on a nation-
wide basis. As a result, after Nicholas and Bowe, relief under 
section 212(c) of the Act is available to narcotics offenders every-
where except in the Ninth Circuit.58 Additionally, on appeal the 
government had not contended in either Nicholas or Bowe that 
relief under section 212(c) of the Act was unavailable to lawful 
permanent resident aliens convicted of narcotics offenses. 59 The 
53.ld. 
54. Interim Decision 2532 (B.I.A. Sept. 10, 1976). 
55. See, e.g., Munoz-Casarez v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 511 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 
1975). 
56. Interim Decision 2532 (B.I.A. Sept. 10, 1976). 
57. 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976). 
58. The situation is well illustrated in the position taken by the Board of Immigration 
Appeals in a recent unreported case decided on August 2,1979. Matter of Monge-Miranda, 
Immigration File No. All 435534 (B.I.A. Aug. 2, 1979). The per curiam decision stated: 
The decision of the immigration judge is affirmed. A waiver of 
excludability under 212(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(c), for a 
charge based on section 241(a)(11) of the Act, is not available 
in the Ninth Circuit. See Bowe v. INS . .. ; Nicholas v. INS 
.... Accordingly, the decision of the immigration judge was 
correct and is affirmed. 
59. 597 F.2d at 1159 (Bright, J., dissenting). See also Byus-Narvaez v. Immigration 
& Nat. Serv., 601 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1979); note 5 supra. 
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facts in Nicholas indicate that the alien was not even a lawful 
permanent resident. Since the language of section 212(c) of the 
Act expressly requires lawful admission for permanent residence, 
relief would have more appropriately been denied on the grounds 
that there had been a failure to meet that requirement. Similarly, 
by following Nicholas blindly without analysis, the Ninth Circuit, 
in Bowe, compounded the error. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The proposition announced in Nicholas v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Service and Bowe v. Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Service that relief under section 212(c) of the Act is unavaila-
ble to any alien narcotics offender deportable under section 
241(a)(11) of the' Act, was advanced without proper authority.60 
The decisions ignored the direct conflict created not only with 
cases in two other circuits, but with an administrative decision 
which had more generously made relief available to alien narcot-
ics offenders. By destroying the possibility of section 212(c) relief 
to narcotics offenders in deportation proceedings in this circuit, 
60. On February 19, 1980, in support of a motion to reopen directed to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals by the alien Bowe, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
surprisingly urged the Board to ignore the Nicholas and Bowe decisions even in the Ninth 
Circuit. The Service's position was that relief under § 212(c) should be administered 
uniformly throughout the country under the Silva decision, and that Nicholas and Bowe 
were decided incorrectly insofar as they hold that § 212(c) relief is unavailable to narcotic 
violators per se. To date the Board has not ruled on Bowe's motion. Memorandum from 
Deputy General Counsel Paul W. Schmidt, INS, to Chairman David L. Milhollan, BIA 
(Feb. 19, 1980). In the recent case of Castillo-Felix v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 601 F.2d 
459 (9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit appears to have limited the Nicholas case to a mere 
reinforcement of the "temporarily proceeded abroad" requirement of § 212(c), as opposed 
to a broader reading which would prohibit such relief in any narcotics cases. In a footnote 
to its opinion, the court stated: 
Consequently, we need not resolve an apparent conflict 
between this circuit and the Second Circuit. In Francis v. INS 
... , the Second Circuit ruled that the nunc pro tunc extension 
of [§ 212(c)] ... violated equal protection. The court held 
that it was irrational to extend [§ 212(c)] relief to deportees 
who had fortuitously departed after committing a deportable 
offense, but deny it to deportees who had not. The INS ac-
quiesced in the Francis ruling and no longer requires actual 
departure by deportees requesting [§ 212(c) 1 relief. Matter of 
Silva . ... 
This circuit, however, continues to recognize the actual 
departure requirement. Arias-Uribe v. INS ... followed in 
Nicholas v. INS . . . Dunn v. INS . . . . Under this line of 
cases, petitioner would fail to qualify for [§ 212(c)] relief be-
cause he did not depart the country after committing the of-
fense for which he is being deported. 
Id. at 462 n.6. 
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the Ninth Circuit has thereby retarded the efforts of the Board 
of Immigration Appeals to more liberally interpret the immigra-
tion laws in favor of such offenders, and has created a serious 
inconsistency in the application of the immigration laws between 
this circuit and all others. The results are unsettling and implore· 
clarification and a more reasoned resolution by the Ninth Circuit. 
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